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Legislative History of the
"Bill of Rights" for
Union Members
Ever since passage of the Landrum-GrifIin Act there has
been a need for expert guidance through the legislative
forest surrounding Title I of the act-the "Bill of Rights"
for union members. In this Article, Mr. Rothman guides
us through the reform movements that preceded legisla-
tive action, surveys the general legislative history of Title
I, examines in detail the history of each section of Title
I, and concludes with an analysis of the history of the
remedial provisions. For those readers who must make an
exhaustive analysis of particular provisions of the act,
Mr. Rothman and his staff have thoughtfully appended a
topical and sectional index to the Legislative History pub-
lished by the NLRB in 1959.
Stuart Rothman*
INTRODUCTION
The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-
Griffin) Act of 19591 guarantees certain rights of union members
in Title I, entitled "Bill of Rights of Members of Labor Organiza-
tions." These rights are set forth in section 101 (a), which has five
subsections dealing with the following subjects: equal rights; free-
dom of speech and assembly; dues, initiation fees and assess-
ments; the right to sue; and disciplinary action. Section 102 pro-
vides that aggrieved members may bring civil actions in federal
district courts.
Immediately upon the passage of the act by Congress, the Of-
fice of the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board
*General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board; B.A., LL.B.,
University of Minnesota; LL.M., Harvard University; Solicitor of U.S. De-
partment of Labor 1953-1959. The author wishes to express his apprecia-
tion to Frank Blumenthel, a member of the staff of the Office of the Gen-
eral Counsel, for his assistance in the preparation of this Article. The views
expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of
any Department or Agency of the United States Government.
1. Public Law 86-257 (Sept. 14, 1959); 73 Stat. 519 (1959).
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(NLRB) commenced the collection and preparation for publica-
tion of the documents and debates which constitute the legislative
history of the act. This agency was primarily concerned with those
provisions (embodied, for the most part, in Title VII of the act)
which amend the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act
of 1947. The agency wished to complete and publish a legislative
history of the amending provisions as quickly as possible for the
information and assistance of persons affected by the amendments,
as well as for the agency's own needs in connection with the ad-
ministration of the amendments. Consequently, the two-volume
Legislative History that was published by this agency in 19592 in-
dexed by topic and section only that part of the legislative mate-
rials relating to the Title VII amendments; with few exceptions,
the indexes do not cover materials relating to Titles I through VI
of the act.
The Department of Labor, which is primarily responsible for
the administration of Titles II through VI, has compiled a legis-
lative history of Titles I through VI. However, this legislative his-
tory has not been published and made available to the public as
has the NLRB's Legislative History.
Title I, the so-called "Bill of Rights" of union members, is not
administered by any federal department or agency; it is enforceable
by civil suits instituted by aggrieved union members. In view of
this lack of an administrative agency to which the public may look
for interpretation of Title I-coupled with the absence of any
published legislative history of the Title-it was considered that
the publication of a topical and sectional index, with page refer-
ences to the NLRB's Legislative History, would be a service to the
public and particularly to those affected by the Title. Such an
index has been prepared and is appended hereto.'
It is rare for any important piece of legislation to be written in
such clear, unambiguous language that resort to legislative history
is not necessary, or at least appropriate, to determine what the
language was intended to mean. In this respect, the Bill of Rights
of union members is no exception. It is hoped that this Article
and the index which accompanies it will help to show what Con-
gress had in mind when it enacted the provisions which comprise
the Bill of Rights.
2. LEoIsLATivE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTINO AND
DIsCLosuRE AcT OF 1959 [hereinafter referred to as LEO. HIST.].
3. See Appendix A.
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I. PRE-LEGISLATIVE ORIGINS
OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS
Although, strictly speaking, the legislative history of the Bill of
Rights begins with the consideration of labor reform bills by Con-
gress in 1959, this history is more meaningful if reference is made
not only to prior congressional activity in the field, but also to
non-congressional consideration and discussion of similar propo-
sals.
Therefore, it may not be too much to say that the 1959 Bill
of Rights was conceived as long ago as 1943. It was in that year
that the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) published an
86-page pamphlet, entitled Democracy in Trade Unions, which
embodied the results of a survey by the ACLU's Committee on
Trade Union Democracy. The stated purpose of the Committee,
which had been created two years previously, was "to study trade
union practices and to suggest remedies for undemocratic pro-
cedures which denied to trade union members what may fairly be
called their civil rights."'
The Committee's report was devoted to the following topics:
the closed union, restrictions on admission to trade unions, dis-
ciplinary action by trade unions, division of power, and how union
policies are made. In the chapter dealing with disciplinary action,
the report argued that while a union must retain sufficient dis-
ciplinary powers to prevent minority and opposition groups from
undermining its effectiveness, members should not be penalized
or expelled for activities involving the following "basic demo-
cratic rights": (1) the right to criticize union officers; (2) the
right to inform fellow members of their opposition; (3) the right
to organize groups within the union to oppose the administra-
tion; and (4) the right-where information channels within the
union are closed--of voicing protests outside the union.' In an-
other section of the report, the right of free speech in unions was
found to be inadequatelyprotected.
The Committee recommended a "Bill of Rights" for union mem-
bers which was basically concerned with guaranteeing the right to
membership in a union, the right of democratic participation in
the conduct of the union, the right to protection against arbitrary
disciplinary proceedings, and the right to fair and equal treatment
as to placement in jobs controlled by the union." The "best im-
plementation" of these guarantees was to have been obtained
4. AMrmcA Cvu. LmERmiTs UNmON, DEMocRAcy N TRDE Umous
8 (1943).
5. Id. at 28-29.
6. Id. at 53-55.
7. td. at 68-69.
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through the constitutions, rules, and regulations of the unions
themselves, supplemented by very limited state and federal legis-
lation and by continued resort to the courts.'
During the 1947 House Labor Committee hearings on proposed
amendments to the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, the
ACLU submitted a "Bill of Rights" as a draft amendment to that
Act.' The proposed amendment was primarily intended to assure
"4open" unions, regular and fair elections, full accounting of union
funds, and protection of union members in their exercise of free
speech in opposition to union leadership. Enforcement was to have
been vested in the NLRB, which would have been empowered to
revoke or condition certifications and to make unfair labor prac-
tice findings on the basis of charges brought by union members
or applicants for membership."0
In 1952 the ACLU published another report entitled De-
mocracy in Labor Unions. This report was prepared by Profes-
sor Clyde W. Summers, who has for many years made many
valuable and widely quoted studies on the rights of union mem-
bers." Largely repeating the substance of the 1943 report, the
new report did not propose any specific legislation, preference still
being given to "an effort to persuade unions to adopt an adequate
program of self-control." In 1958 the ACLU stated its belief that
this report had "helped shape present-day thinking""2 leading up
to the Senate passage of the Kennedy-Ives bill in that year.
After the first disclosures of improper union activities by the
McClellan Committee and related investigations, the AFL-CIO
Executive Council in 1956 and 1957 adopted several "codes of
ethical practices," the sixth of which dealt with "union democratic
practices."' 3 Included in the "democratic rights" of union mem-
8. Id. at 66-84 passim.
9. Hearings before the House Committee on Education and Labor on
Bills to Amend and Repeal the National Labor Relations Act, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess., 3633-43 (1947).
10. A similar approach was taken by Representative Jacobs two years
later in proposing H.R. 4914, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949). See Aaron &
Komaroff, Statutory Regulation of Internal Union Affairs-lI, 44 ILL. L.
REv. 631, 636-37 (1949).
11. See, e.g., Summers, The Usefulness of Law in Achieving Union
Democracy, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 44 (May 1958); Summers, Disciplinary
Powers of Unions, 3 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 483 (1950); Summers, Dis-
ciplinary Procedures of Unions, 4 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 15 (1950); Sum-
mers, The Right to Join a Union, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 33 (1947); Sum-
mers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HAiv. L. REv. 104(1951).
12. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, A LABOR UNION "BILL OF
RIGHTS"-DEMOCRACY IN LABOR UNIONS-THE KENNEDY-IVEs BILL 3
(Sept. 1958).
13. These codes are set forth in full in 2 LEG. HIST. 1405-10, and sum-
marized in LEVITAN, GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF INTERNAL UNION
AFFAIRS AFFECTING THE RIGHTS OF MEMBERS 6-7 (1958).
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bers which the Council stated should be zealously guaranteed by
all AFL-CIO affiliates were the right to democratic participation
in union affairs, the right to fair treatment in the application of
union disciplinary regulations, and the right to criticize union pol-
icies and leaders without undermining the union as an institution.
The "union democratic practices" code also included other rights
-such as free elections--eventually covered by the Landrum-
Griffin Act.
The ACLU adopted a new "Bill of Rights" on March 21,
1958,14 to comport with its "new thinking" with regard to prob-
lems which had arisen after its 1952 report. Section I of that "Bill
of Rights" specifically set forth the right of union members freely
to speak, publish, and assemble. In terms of the Landrum-Griffin
Act, section I of the ACLU's "Bill of Rights" bore a close re-
semblance to section 101 (a) (2) of the act, although the ACLU
provision was more detailed. Similarly, section VI of the ACLU's
"Bill of Rights," relating to due process within the union, appears
to have foreshadowed section 101 (a) (5) of the act, although the
ACLU provision was considerably more detailed than either sec-
tion 101(a) (5) as finally enacted or the longer versions of that
section which were originally proposed by Senator McClellan. Oth-
er sections of the ACLU's "Bill of Rights," dealing with equal
treatment by the union and with the right of members to vote and
participate in meetings, likewise presaged provisions finally enact-
ed in section 101(a) (1) of the Act. The ACLU's "Bill of Rights"
was presented and explained to the Senate Labor Committee at its
Spring 1958 hearings' on bills (chiefly the Kennedy-Ives Bill)
covering the bulk of the McClellan recommendations, one of
which concerned democratic practices of unions.
It should be emphasized at this point that the ACLU proposals
had hitherto contemplated very narrow legislative sanctions. At
the 1958 Senate hearings, the ACLU spokesman limited his en-
forcement recommendation to review by an administrative agency,
which would have acted as a public prosecutor only in extreme
cases.' 6 The possibility of providing for private suits in the federal
courts by aggrieved members, as finally provided by Title I of the
act, was almost totally-if not completely-ignored by all author-
ities up to this time.
14. See pamphlet cited in note 12 supra.
15. Hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Labor on Union Fi-
nancial and Administrative Practices and Procedures, 85th Cong., 1st Sess.(1958).
16. Id. at pp. 1115-33.
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H. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS
The McClellan Committee investigations provided the impetus
for the enactment of Title I. Without these investigations it seems
extremely doubtful that there would have been compelling pres-
sure in Congress for any type of legislation relating to internal
union affairs. In March of 1958 the Committee made five "inter-
im" recommendations, one of which was for legislation to "in-
sure union democracy."17 This recommendation was primarily
designed-as were many of the earlier nonlegislative proposals
dealt with in previous paragraphs-to secure free and secret elec-
tions, as well as to limit the trusteeship practice with its attendant
abuses.
To carry out the McClellan recommendations, Senator Kennedy
introduced S. 3974, the Kennedy-Ives Bill, which was reported out
by the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare after ex-
tensive hearings on that bill and related bills. 8 The Kennedy-
Ives Bill, however, did not deal with any of the major topics even-
tually embraced by Title I of the Landrum-Griffin Act, and Senator
Goldwater called attention to this in his minority views."9 Re-
ferring to the most recent ACLU report on the need for a union
"Bill of Rights," he criticized the Kennedy-Ives Bill for failing to
deal with such matters as freedom of speech and press, equal
treatment of members, and union disciplinary proceedings. Senator
Goldwater then stated his intention to offer substitute legislation
to "establish a machinery which will enable the members of unions
through their own initiative to take the necessary action to assure
the rights and democratic procedures set forth" by the ACLU.
Senator Goldwater's chief bill2" contained a separate title deal-
ing with "democratic rights of union members and employees"
(note the addition of "employees," i.e., nonmembers), the enforce-
ment of which was to be almost completely entrusted to the NLRB.
The "democratic rights" dealt with in this bill were the recall of
union officers, referenda on internal affairs (i.e., proposals to re-
peal, amend, or otherwise change any provision in the union's
constitution, by-laws, or other governing rules or regulations), vot-
ing in any such referendum or in any union election, and majority
approval of a no-strike clause. Criminal penalties were provided
for the willful restraint or coercion of any employee or member
seeking to initiate or participate in any of the aforementioned pro-
cedures or activities. Like the Kennedy-Ives Bill, Senator Gold-
water's bill made no mention of free speech, equal treatment, and
17. S. REP. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
18. See Hearings, note 15 supra.
19. S. REP. No. 1684, 85th Cong., 2d Sess,, pp. 52-53 (1958).
20. S. 3954, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
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the other "rights and democratic procedures" championed by the
ACLU.
When the Kennedy-Ives Bill passed the Senate but failed to get
past the House in 1958, the legislative wheels started rolling again
in January, 1959, with a new-but similar-labor reform bill
known as the Kennedy-Ervin Bill.2 This is the bill which, after
complex legislative maneuvers, eventually became the Labor-Man-
agement Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. Since the genesis
of Title I thereof forms an important and absorbing chapter in the
legislative history of the Act, and is essential to a full understand-
ing of its particular provisions, a step-by-step account of the de-
velopment of Title I is given below. Following this account, legis-
lative history pertinent to each section of Title I will be given.
A. GENERAL HISTORY OF TITLE I
After subcommittee hearings on the Kennedy-Ervin Bill and re-
lated bills had been closed in early 1959,1 Senator McClellan in-
troduced a new and comprehensive bill which included a Title I
entitled "Rights to be Guaranteed in Charters of Labor Organiza-
tions." The first part of this title dealt with "basic rights" of
union members and was, for all practical purposes, the forerunner
of the finally enacted Bill of Rights, although the McClellan ver-
sion was somewhat longer and more detailed than the final legis-
lation. Because of Senator McClellan's "long experience in the
field" and his "exceptional leadership" of the investigating com-
mittee, Senator Kennedy took the unusual step of reconvening
the subcommittee hearings to receive Senator McClellan's explana-
tion of his bill.
In his appearance before the subcommittee,2 Senator McClel-
lan stated his belief that every union seeking representation or
complaint rights under the National Labor Relations Act, as well
as tax exemption, should comply with basic minimum standards
set by Congress. These proposed standards, it should be noted,
were not limited to protection of the specified basic rights, but ex-
tended to other provisions of Title I of his bill which covered union
elections, certain union funds, union meetings and conventions,
and related matters dealt with in other titles of the final act. Also,
it is noteworthy that the bill required union charters to contain
these various guarantees, a sweeping provision that was finally wa-
21. S. 505, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
22. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on
Labor and Public Welfare of the Senate on Labor-Management Reform
Legislation, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
23. S. 1137, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), reprinted at 1 LEo. HIsT.
260-324.
24. Hearings, supra note 22, at 647.
205
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
tered down to a provision merely making inconsistent charter pro-
visions "of no force or effect."
Little attention has been given to the fact that on February 16,
1959, three days before Senator McClellan introduced his bill,
Representative Barden introduced a substantially similar bill in the
House.2 5 There is no published information to indicate whether or
not the two Congressmen co-operated on this matter. However,
Senator McClellan gave a summary analysis of his bill to the Sen-
ate on February 19, whereas Representative Barden did not simi-
larly deal with his own bill until February 24.2"
On April 14, the Senate Labor Committee reported out S. 1555
as its version of the proposed labor reform bill,2" but the "basic
rights" section was not included and the committee majority report
implicitly rejected such extensive guarantees of individual rights
and intrusions into the internal affairs of unions. The minority,
comprising only Senators Goldwater and Dirksen, protested that
the bill did nothing to guarantee certain rights proposed by the
ACLU-freedom of speech, press, and assembly; equal treatment
of members; and due process in union disciplinary proceedings.
The minority implied that it would press further for inclusion of
such provisions, but subsequent events made this unnecessary.
During the Senate's consideration of S. 1555, Senator McClel-
Ian offered his "Bill of Rights" as an amendment thereto. 8 This
amendment was substantially similar to Title I of his original bill.
The chief objection to the amendment, as stated by Senator Ken-
nedy, was that the protection of the rights covered by the amend-
ment were better left to existing state laws, to the Taft-Hartley
Act, and to S. 1555. Senator Kennedy also argued that the provi-
sion for enforcement by the Secretary of Labor was inconsistent
with the elimination of the scheme for federal enforcement from
the civil rights bill. Senator McClellan replied that the states would
be ousted from jurisdiction by the principle of federal pre-emption.
His amendment was twice approved by a one-vote margin on April
22.
Two days later the Kuchel "substitute" amendment, a so-called
compromise prepared by a group of nine Senators,2" was intro-
25. H.R. 4473, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); see 2 LEo. HIST. 1466.
26. 105 CONG. REc. 2407-17 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1959) (remarks of Sen-
ator McClellan); 105 CONG. REC. 2574-76 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1959) (re-
marks of Congressman Borden).
27. S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); reprinted at 1 LEo.
HIST. 397-515.
28. 105 CONG. REc. 5810 (daily ed. April 22, 1959) (remarks of Sen-
ator McClellan).
29. For the text of the Kuchel amendment and a list of its sponsors,
see 2 LEG. HIST. 1220.
Professor Archibald Cox, who worked closely with Senators during the
evolution of the labor reform bill, has stated that during the two-day prep-
[Vol. 45: 199206
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duced and easily passed on April 25. Its main points of difference
from the original McClellan proposals were:
(1) the substitution of private civil suits for those filed by the
Secretary of Labor;
(2) the addition of language specifying the ways in which
members have "equal rights" within the labor organization;
(3) the addition of qualifying language, making a member's
participation privileges in union affairs subject to reasonable union
rules and regulations, and of similar language as to the handling
of union meetings and the member's rights of speech and assem-
bly, thus presumably permitting the union to guard against anti-
union activities within the union;
(4) transfer of the provisions relating to the right of candi-
dates for office to inspect membership lists out of the "Bill of
Rights" and into Title IV, dealing with elections; and
(5) the addition of a restriction on employer participation in
civil suits, apparently intended to prevent union members from
"fronting" for employers.
The "Bill of Rights" provided in the Senate-passed bill was
evaluated and criticized by witnesses appearing before the House
committee, which had been holding hearings on labor reform pro-
posals for some time before the Senate passed its bill.11 As a re-
sult, the bill reported out by the House committee on July 2331
contained several important modifications of the Senate bill:
(1) The term "equal rights" was retitled "rights of [union]
members," and these rights were further made "subject to reason-
able qualifications uniformly imposed."
(2) The section on "freedom from arbitrary financial exac-
tions" was renamed "Dues, Initiation Fees and Assessments," and
the section was revised to eliminate regulation of decreases in
dues and also to permit national and international unions or in-
termediate bodies to increase dues and other fees by majority vote
of their executive or other governing boards, as well as by secret-
ballot vote by members at conventions.
(3) The House bill eliminated from the 'Protection of the
aration of this compromise, "Many groups had to be consulted and since
the Senate had proceeded to other sections of the bill the work was done
late at night or in little knots upon the Senate floor. The draftsmanship
left much to be desired, perhaps because of the haste and stress, the num-
ber of participants, and the priority of tactical acceptability over nicety
of expression." Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor
Reform Act of 1959, 58 MICH. L. REv. 819, 833 (1960).
30. Hearings before the Joint Subcommittee on Labor-Management Re-form Legislation of the House Committee on Education and Labor on H.
R. 3540 and Related Bills, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). Some of the chief
objections made before this subcommittee are summarized in Hickey, The
Bill of Rights of Union Members, 48 GEO. L. J. 226, 234-39 (1959).
31. H. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
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Right to Sue" section the six-month time limit imposed by the
Senate bill on a union's right to require a member to exhaust
"reasonable" internal union procedures before resorting to court
action, but a similar limitation was written into section 102 (which
provides for private suits to enforce all section 101 rights).
(4) The House bill provided that procedural safeguards, such
as the requirement of a fair hearing on written charges, would
come into play after a member was fined, suspended, or other-
wise disciplined (rather than as prerequisites to such disciplinary
action), thus preserving the union's right to act summarily against
wrongdoing officers or members.
(5) The House bill eliminated the criminal sanctions provided
by the Senate bill.
The House committee report32 was almost completely devoid
of any explanation or discussion of the basic provisions of the bill,
aside from the statement that the provisions of Title I of the bill
were "premised" on the McClellan Committee recommendation for
legislation to insure union democracy.
After some debate-which throws almost no light on the legis-
lative history of the Bill of Rights from the House point of view-
the House substituted the Landrum-Griffin Bill for the House com-
mittee bill and passed it on August 14. With respect to the Bill
of Rights, the Landrum-Griffin Bill was substantially the same
as the original Senate bill, except that it:
(1) adopted the House committee's version of the section on
dues, fees, and assessments;
(2) modified the Senate provision for a time limit on union-
compelled exhaustion of internal union remedies prior to suit by
an aggrieved member, by reducing this limit from six to four
months-presumably to permit resort to the NLRB if necessary;
(3) provided for criminal sanctions, but placed them in the
catch-all category of Title VI and limited their application to
cases involving interference with members' rights by force and
violence, or threats thereof;
(4) adopted the House committee's action in transferring to
Title I the paragraph relating to the unions' obligation to furnish
copies of bargaining contracts (and in adopting this action freed
the unions from criminal sanctions, in favor of civil enforcement
by the Secretary of Labor); and
(5) eliminated from the bill's definition of the term "mem-
ber," or "member in good standing," a person who had merely
"tendered" the lawful requirements for union membership, there-
by preserving a union's authority to determine who should be ad-
mitted to membership.33
32. Ibid.
33. This, it may be observed, had the effect of harmonizing the new
208 [Vol. 45:199
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The conference report bill adopted the House version of Title I
in toto. This bill was enacted without change by the Senate on Sep-
tember 3, and by the House on September 4.
B. INDIVIMUAL HISTORIES OF SPECIFIC RIGHTS
With this general history of the Bill of Rights in mind, it is now
appropriate to consider specific congressional discussion of each
of the five subsections which comprise the Bill of Rights. General-
ly speaking, almost all of the pertinent discussion was on the
floor of the Senate. The remarks of members of the House of
Representatives, as well as the various committee reports, throw
little if any light on the intended purpose or meaning of these
sections.
1. Section 101(a)(1)-Equal Rights
Section 101(a)(1) guarantees all union members "equal
rights and privileges" in the nomination and election of union of-
ficers and in the determination of union policies at membership
meetings, "subject to reasonable rules and regulations in such or-
ganization's constitution and by-laws."
As originally introduced by Senator McClellan in his bill and re-
peated in his "amendment" (which passed by one vote), this sec-
tion did not spell out in any detail the "equal rights and privi-
leges" to be protected, except that they were to include "identical
voting rights and equal protection of the union's rules and regula-
tions"; there was no stated thought of preserving the union's right
to make and enforce reasonable rules and regulations. 3' Senator
McClellan very briefly explained his proposal on April 22 by re-
ferring to his committee's repeated disclosures of union denials of
the right of union members to vote, work, and have a voice in
union affairs--denials of "the basic human rights on which our
very freedom was founded."-, The Kuchel compromise amend-
ment, offered three days later, was identical with the provision as
finally enacted, including the union's right as to rules and regula-
tions. Senator Kuchel made no explanation of the choice of rights
and privileges set forth, but he did state that the McClellan provi-
sion was considered too broad, and that such equal rights as were
not specified in the new paragraph were not being thereby taken
law with the "union rules" proviso in § 8(b) (1) (A) of the Taft-Hartley Act
which provides that nothing therein shall "impair the right of a labor
organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or
retention of membership therein." 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158
(b) (1) (A) (1958).
34. Senator McClellan, however, stated much later that this bill im-
plicitly protected a union's right to make and enforce such rules and
regulations. 2 LEG. IST. 1294. However, the bill did not so specify.
35. Id. at 1103.
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away from members unless a federal court determined that it was
reasonable for the union to curtail such rights.30
Several other Senators, including Senator Kennedy, stated for
the legislative history that the enumeration of certain rights was
not intended to have the effect of excluding other rights. 7 Their
position appears to have been based upon section 103, which spe-
cifically preserved all other rights of union members "under any
State or Federal law or before any court or other tribunal." How-
ever, Senator Holland pointed out that section 103-as then
written--did not preserve rights under union charters or by-laws
and regulations; this defect was later remedied by the addition of
such rights to the language of section 103. Senator Aiken, another
member of the "Kuchel group," observed that the reason for using
more restricted "equal rights" language in the Kuchel version than
had been used in the McClellan version was to permit unions to
expel known Communists and criminals; but Senator McClellan,
with Senator Kennedy's backing, argued that his bill would not
have accommodated Communists. Little attention was given to the
"reasonable rules" clause, and Senator Lausche pointed this out.
After the Kuchel version had been passed by the Senate,
section 101 (a) (1) was criticized by Senator Goldwater, on the
ground that it was not sufficiently broad, and by Senator Morse,
on the theory that it unduly projected the "Federal Government"
(apparently referring to the courts) into matters already handled
by state courts under existing law. 8
The House committee, deleting the references to rights as
"equal," reworded the subsection without material change in its
meaning, but subjected the rights only to "reasonable qualifica-
tions uniformly imposed," a more general requirement. As with
other subsections of the Bill of Rights, little consideration was giv-
en on the House floor to the intent or meaning of section
101(a) (1), and the House eventually substituted the Landrum-
Griffin Bill for the committee version. The Landrum-Griffin Bill
was, with respect to the "equal rights" provision, identical with
the Senate-passed bill.
2. Section 101(a)(2)-Freedom of Speech and Assembly
Section 101(a) (2) provides that "every member . . . shall
have the right to meet and assemble freely with other members
. . . and to express at meetings of the labor organization his
views upon candidates . . . or upon any business properly be-
fore the meeting." However, the subsection preserves the union's
36. Id. at 1231.
37. Id. at 1231-34passim.
38. Id. at 1270, 1280 (Sen. Goldwater) & 1414 (Sen. Morse).
[Vol. 45:199210
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right "to adopt and enforce reasonable rules" relating to the mem-
bership's responsibility toward the organization as an institution
and restraining members from conduct which would interfere with
the union's performance of its legal or contractual obligations.
In its first legislative forms (the McClellan bill and amend-
ment), section 101(a) (2) was broken down into two separate
subsections dealing respectively with free speech and free assem-
bly, both being more far-reaching than was the final version. Not
only were the detailed provisions which preserved the union's right
to reasonable rules absent in the McClellan versions, but also
there was included a broad freedom of members from "penalty,
discipline or interference of any kind." The freedom of speech
and assembly provisions aroused considerable interest on the
Senate floor only after the introduction of the Kuchel amendment,
in which section 101(a)(2) emerged substantially as finally
enacted. On Senator McClellan's motion, a semicolon was inserted
for the express purpose of making clear that union members would
have freedom of speech outside the union hall as well as inside.3"
Senator Lausche pointed out that the Kuchel substitute did not
guarantee absolute free speech as did the original McClellan pro-
posal, but his plea for an explanation of this change was not di-
rectly answered. In the same vein, Senator Goldwater expressed
grave misgivings concerning the retention of the "reasonable rules"
proviso, because it would preserve the union's right to limit mem-
bers' rights merely by constitutional or rules provisions. 0 In re-
buttal, Senator Kuchel stated for the legislative history that this
was not the intention of his group. When Senator Goldwater pro-
posed an amendment having the effect of removing the proviso,
several Senators opposed his proposal and the matter was even-
tually resolved by deleting six words from the proviso.41
The House committee bill was the same as the Senate-passed
Kuchel amendment except that it omitted the "reasonable rules"
proviso-an omission unexplained by the committee. The proviso
was restored by the Landrum-Griffin Bill and enacted as such. As
with section 101(a) (1), there was no interpretive discussion of
section 101 (a) (2).
3. Section 101(a)(3)-Dues, Fees, Assessments
This section establishes exclusive and detailed procedures by
which a union may levy assessments and increase its dues and ini-
39. Id. at 1234.
40. Id. at 1235-36.
41. As originally submitted, the proviso read: "Provided, that the fore-
going is limited so that nothing herein shall be construed to impair the
right of a labor organization to adopt and enforce reasonable rules . ..
The six italicized words were deleted. Id. at 1239.
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tiation fees. In general, majority-vote authorization by the union's
appropriate electoral body is required, and separate procedures are
provided for local unions and national (or international) unions.
The expression of legislative intent as to this section was al-
most nil, despite its length and its potential importance in the prac-
tical operation of union membership rules. Senator McClellan's
first version was very brief (in direct contrast with the other sub-
sections, which started out their legislative history by being long
and general) and made no mention of intra-union procedures."2
But the clue to the inclusion of section 101(a) (3) in the Bill
of Rights may be found in its original titie, "Freedom from Ar-
bitrary Financial Exactions," which was retained until the sub-
section reached the House Labor Committee.
Senator McClellan's amended version was considerably expand-
ed over his original one-sentence provision, and foreshadowed
section 101(a)(3) as finally enacted. The amended provi-
sion did not, however, carefully distinguish between procedures
applicable to local unions and those reserved for international
unions; it prohibited any change in dues and fees-as well as the
adoption of new ones-without the required procedures (where-
as the final Act applies only to increases in existing dues and
fees); and it contained a regulation of initiation fees (eventually
dropped) which would have limited an individual's fee to 75 per
cent of the prevailing weekly wage payable to employees in the
same job category "in the vicinity of such bargaining unit." Sena-
tor McClellan explained that his amended provision was designed
to prevent such union practices as "hiking up" the initiation fees
for newly created jobs and then assigning those jobs to new mem-
bers rather than old members, in order to obtain the larger fees."3
The Kuchel amendment retained and slightly rephrased the de-
tailed procedures contained in the McClellan version, and elimi-
nated the curb on initiation fees."' Senator Kuchel did not make
42. The provision read: "Rules relating to the rate of dues and initiation
fees, or the levying of any special or general assessment, may be adopted
or amended only after due notice and by general vote." 1 LEo. HIsT. 269.
43. 2 LEo. HIsT. 1104.
44. This action may have been prompted by Senator Kennedy's observa-
tion on the floor that freedom from exorbitant initiation fees was guar-
anteed by § 8(b) (5) of the Taft-Hartley Act, which makes it an unfair la-
bor practice for a union to require, under a valid union-security contract,
an initiation fee in an amount which the Board finds excessive or discrimi-
natory under all the circumstances. 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158
(b) (5) (1958). It should be noted, however, that there have been very few
cases filed under § 8(b) (5) in the 13 years following its enactment (some
17 charges were filed in fiscal 1959); and in only three cases has the Board
found an initiation fee excessive or discriminatory. Local 839, Motion Pic-
ture Screen Cartoonists, IATSE, 121 N.L.R.B. 1196 (1958); Local 153,
UAW, 99 N.L.R.B. 1419 (1952); Ferro Stamping and Mfg. Co., 93 N.
L.R.B. 1459 (1951).
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any statement on this question and it was not discussed on the
Senate floor.
The House committee further revised the section to its final
form-including the adoption of its present title (eliminating
reference to arbitrary exactions), the limitation of its application
to increases in existing dues and fees, and the inclusion of sep-
arate procedures for locals and internationals---and it became law
without discussion.
4. Section 101(a)(4)-Right to Sue
This section prohibits a union from limiting the right of
any member to institute a court action or administrative proceed-
ing, although the member may be required to exhaust "reason-
able hearing procedures" within the union which do not exceed
a four-month lapse of time. A proviso states that no interested em-
ployer shall directly or indirectly finance, encourage or participate
in any member suit or action under this subsection except as a
party thereto.
Both of Senator McClellan's versions of this clause were some-
what similar to the final one, except that they provided a three-
month limitation on the exhaustion of internal procedures and did
not contain the "interested employer" proviso. Senator Javits raised
the question whether any time period was necessary, to which
Senator McClellan replied that he did not care what period was
specified, provided that it was a definite one and was not so long
that a union could obstruct the rights of its members."'
At this point the possible interplay of section 10(b) of the
Taft-Hartley Act, which requires the filing of a charge within
six months of an alleged unfair labor practice, had not been rais-
ed.46 The Kuchel amendment47 provided a six-month period, but
no explanation was offered and there was no discussion of this
provision before its adoption by the Senate. That body was solely
concerned with the discussion and adoption of the employer pro-
viso, which was first included in the Kuchel amendment without
the term "interested." Calling attention to this clause and expres-
sing approval thereof, Senator Goldwater suggested an amendment
which would have excluded from the proviso's application an em-
ployer having no dispute or other connection with the union con-
cerned. After some discussion of the fact that the proviso was not
45. 2 LEG. HIST. 1106.
46. After Senate passage of the Kennedy-Ervin bill, Senator Goldwa-
ter pointed out that the six-month limit was sufficiently long to stymie
resort to the NLRB. Id. at 1270 & 1280.
47. This amendment specifically gave a union officer (as well as a mem-




intended to embrace employers such as a bank from whom an
employee seeks to borrow money for a suit against his union,
Senator Kuchel stated that Senator Javits had suggested the inclu-
sion of the term "interested." This met with everyone's satisfaction.48
The House committee modified section 101(a)(4) by de-
leting the six-month provision, but the same effect was apparently
intended to be accomplished by the inclusion of a similar six-
month clause in the civil enforcement provisions of section 102,
which is applicable to all rights.49 The committee also extended
the scope of the employer proviso to prohibit any interference or
attempts to interfere with a union's internal affairs.
The very first point discussed by Representative Landrum, in
introducing the Landrum-Griffin Bill as a substitute for the com-
mittee bill, was the exhaustion of remedies. The committee bill
would have required available remedies to be exhausted before
a suit could be filed, provided that the process did not extend as
long as six months; the Landrum-Griffin Bill would have allow-
ed a member to seek immediate court redress after four months,
in the words of Representative Landrum, "without the further de-
laying and dilatory route of exhausting union procedures," there-
by providing "effective and timely relief."5 Representative Grif-
fin's analysis of the bill pointed out that the four-month substitute
for the Senate provision was designed to preclude possible loss
of the right to file a charge with the NLRB."' Opponents of a time
limit spoke against it on the ground that common-law and union
procedures, including appeals to national or international bodies at
their conventions, should not be disturbed. Congressman McCor-
mack declared that protection of access to the NLRB was not
necessary because the doctrine of exhaustion of internal remedies
was not applicable to NLRB proceedings.5" The House eventual-
ly passed section 101 (a) (4) in the form proposed by the Lan-
drum-Griffin Bill.
Two statements made after the conference committee agreement
48. 2 LEG. HIST. 1236-39.
49. The House committee's version of section 102 read as follows:
(a) Any person -(1) who is aggrieved by any violation of section
101; and (2) who has exhausted the reasonable remedies available
under the constitution and bylaws of a labor organization . . . or has
diligently pursued such available remedies without obtaining a final
decision within six calendar months after their being invoked; may
bring a civil action ....
H.R. 8342, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 102 (1959); 1 LEG. HIST. 700.
50. 2 LEG. HIST. 1518.
51. Id. at 1520, 1566-67.
52. Id. at 1667. The Board has intimated that the pendency of intra-
union proceedings does not affect its duty to resolve issues under the act.
See S.G. Adams Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 1012 (1956).
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merit attention. Senator Kennedy, calling attention to the fact that
the conferees had adopted the four-month period, stated:
The basic intent and purpose of the provision was to insure the right
of a union member to resort to the courts, administrative agencies, and
legislatures without interference or frustration of that right by a labor
organization. On the other hand, it was not, and is not, the purpose of
the law to eliminate existing grievance procedures established by union
constitutions for redress of alleged violation of their internal govern-
ing laws. Nor is it the intent or purpose of the provision to invalidate
the considerable body of State and Federal court decisions of many
years standing which require, or do not require, the exhaustion of in-
ternal remedies prior to court intervention depending upon the reason-
ableness of such requirements in terms of the facts and circumstances
of a particular case. So long as the union member is not prevented by
his union from resorting to the courts, the intent and purpose of the
"right to sue" provision is fulfilled, and any requirements which the
court may then impose in terms of pursuing reasonable remedies with-
in the organization to redress violation of his union constitutional rights
will not conflict with the statute. The doctrine of exhaustion of rea-
sonable internal union remedies for violation of union laws is just as
firmly established as the doctrine of exhausting reasonable adminis-
trative agency provisions prior to action by courts.
The 4-month limitation in the House bill also relates to restrictions
imposed by unions rather than the rules of judicial administration or
the action of Government agencies. For example, the National Labor
Relations Board is not prohibited from entertaining charges by a mem-
ber against a labor organization even though 4 months has not elaps-
ed.53
It is not clear from this statement whether the four-month pe-
riod was decided upon to permit access to the NLRB. Representa-
tive Griffin told the House the next day'A that the section 101
(a) (4) proviso was not intended to impose a new restriction on
members but rather to place a maximum on the length of time
required to exhaust internal remedies, and that no obligation was
imposed to exhaust futile or unduly burdensome procedures. He
also stated that the proviso was not intended to limit the right to
file NLRB charges (or the right of the NLRB to entertain
charges), even if the four-month period had not expired.
Representative Griffin also stated that the employer proviso was
intended-
[to insure that] interested employers do not take advantage of rights
accorded union members by encouraging or financing harassing suits
or proceedings brought by union members against their unions. The
purpose of the proviso should be kept in mind and it should not be so
narrowly construed as to impose unnecessary or unintended restrictions
upon employers in their relationship with their employees. For exam-
ple, the language does not prevent, and there is no intent to pre-
clude, an employer from encouraging his employees to write or other-
wise communicate with their Congressman or legislators concerning
legislation.-s
53. 2 LEG. HIST. 1432.
54. Id. at 1811.
55. Ibid.
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5. Section 1 01(a)(5)--Disciplinary Action
This section prohibits a union from disciplining a member
(except for nonpayment of dues) unless he is served with written
specific charges, given a reasonable time to prepare his defense,
and afforded a full and fair hearing.
Both of the McClellan proposals on safeguarding against im-
proper disciplinary action were aimed at the same objective as the
final law. However, they were considerably more detailed and
provided more safeguards, such as more exhaustive internal pro-
cedures and the opportunity for independent final review by an
outside tribunal. What Senator Kuchel called "cumbersome and
unnecessary language" therein was pared down greatly by the cor-
responding provision of his substitute amendment which became
section 101 (a) (5). Senator Kuchel also stated that since civil rem-
edies had been provided in addition to the criminal penalty original-
ly in the McClellan bills, a court would be "able to determine
whether the rights of the union member have been protected and
whether he has had constitutionally reasonable notice and a rea-
sonable hearing, and whether the matter has been reasonably dis-
posed of."56 Little discussion of this provision took place on ei-
ther floor of Congress. The House committee provided that the
safeguards would come into play only after disciplinary action had
taken place, but this change was nullified by the Landrum-Grif-
fin Bill and the final law. The conference report and chief con-
ferees all made clear that section 101 (a) (5) was not intended to
apply to suspension of a union member's status as an officer of
the union."
C. HISTORY OF REMEDIAL SECTIONS
1. Section 102--Civil Enforcement
Section 102 contains the provision that any person whose Title
I rights have been infringed by any violation of that title may
bring a civil suit in a federal district court for appropriate relief.
The original McClellan Bill (S. 1137) provided for civil suits
by the Secretary of Labor as well as by the aggrieved person. Se-
vere criminal penalties contained in the enforcement section of this
bill would also have applied to violations of the Bill of Rights. The
McClellan amendment to S. 1555 (passed originally by the Sen-
ate) omitted any provision for private suits, and included crimi-
nal penalties as a specific sanction applicable to the Bill of Rights.
It was the inclusion of enforcement provisions specifically appli-
56. Id. at 1232.
57. t.R. REP. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1959); 2 LEo. HIST.
1433.
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cable to enumerated rights that prompted Senator Kennedy to de-
clare several times that the Bill of Rights was unnecessary, since
union members' rights were more satisfactorily protected by other
provisions of S. 1555, by state law, and by the Taft-Hartley Act.
It should be noted that up to this point the McClellan proposals
had contained no provision analogous to section 103 of the Act,
which preserves other state and federal remedies; thus there was
implicit in S. 1555, as then written, the question whether affirma-
tive provisions to enforce the newly defined rights could be con-
sidered pre-emptive. Senator Kennedy said that if the Bill of Rights
were enacted, the more exhaustive state remedies which already
existed might be wiped out. He argued that where the federal law
contained specific provisions for the safeguarding of certain rights,
those matters would be pre-empted. Senator Kennedy contended
that the matters covered by the body of S. 1555 (e.g., union elec-
tions and trusteeships) should be pre-empted, but that those con-
tained in the Bill of Rights-being less easily definable--should
not be pre-empted.8 The upshot of the long discussion of the
pre-emption issue was that Senator McClellan offered a detailed
amendment, accepted without objection, specifically safeguarding
rights and remedies under any other federal or state law.1
The Kuchel substitute which was passed by the Senate elimi-
nated the provision for suits by the Secretary of Labor and moved
the criminal penalties back to the body of the omnibus bill, leav-
ing only private suits as a specific remedy under Title I. This was
hailed by some Senators as taking the federal bureaucracy out
of the Bill of Rights.60
The House committee bill followed the Senate bill except that
criminal penalties were deleted from the body of the bill. Its civil
action provision, however, encompassed an exhaustion of internal
remedies requirement applicable to all rights in Title I. The Lan-
drum-Griffin version, which became the law, provided (in section
610) moderate criminal penalties for physical interference (by
force or violence, or threat thereof) with any rights set forth in
the entire bill, as well as the private suit remedy in section 102.
2. Sections 609 and 610--Criminal Enforcement
The legislative history of section 610,1 which is applicable to
violations of all titles of the act and which provides for penalties
of one year's imprisonment and/or a $1,000 fine, highlights the
variety of methods proposed for enforcing union members' rights
58. 2 LEo. IST. 1108-19 passim.
59. Id. at 1114.
60. Id. at 1233 & 1238.
61. An index of page references to the legislative history of § 610 is
contained in the published Legislative History cited in note 2 supra.
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guaranteed by Title I and other titles. Neither the Kennedy-Ives
Bill nor the Kennedy-Ervin Bill contained any provision for crimi-
nal penalties for violation of the rights of union members-nor
did either bill provide for civil suits, other than by the Secretary
of Labor. Senator McClellan's original bill contained a provision
(section 413a) substantially similar to the final section 610, ex-
cept that the earlier version would have permitted imprisonment
for five years and/or a fine of $10,000. This criminal penalty was
added to the Kennedy-Ervin Bill by the Senate committee-at the
behest of the minority members, according to Senator Goldwater."2
Apparently intended to protect the right of union members to
nominate candidates for and vote in union elections, 3 this provi-
sion formed the basis for Senator McClellan's objection that the
Kennedy-Ervin Bill (then lacking any Bill of Rights) only vaguely
defined the rights which a union member was to be entitled to
exercise under the act-rights the interference with which was
to be punishable by criminal penalty. 4 The Senate-passed version
of the bill retained the criminal provision and made it applicable
to all titles of the bill. The House bill that was reported to the
floor contained no blanket criminal sanctions but contained sep-
arate enforcement provisions in each title; the Landrum-Griffin
substitute, which substantially followed the Senate version, was
amended without objection on the floor to reduce the penalties to
one year and/or $1,000" and was eventually approved by the
conferees in this form.
Section 609 provides that it shall be unlawful for a union or its
agent to fine, suspend, expel or otherwise discipline a member for
exercising any right guaranteed under the Act, and that the pri-
vate civil suit provisions of section 102 shall be applicable for en-
forcement purposes. Section 60960 is of interest in our considera-
tion of the Bill of Rights not only because of its specific adoption
of the section 102 enforcement method, but also because it ap-
pears to complement section 101(a)(5), relating to safeguards
against disciplinary action. In fact, section 609 may have been
suggested by section 101(a)(5), which was fathered by Senator
McClellan. As in the case of section 61 0-and for the same rea-
sons-section 609 was incorporated into the Kennedy-Ervin Bill
by the Senate committee, criticized by Senator McClellan, and
passed by the Senate6 T At that time, it did not contain the civil
62. 2 LEG. HIST. 1855.
63. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 187, supra note 27, and 2 LEo. HIST. 1140.
64. 2 LEG. HIST. 1104-05.
65. Id. at 1685.
66. An index of page references to the legislative history of § 609 is
contained in the published Legislative History cited in note 2 supra.
67. See legislative history to which reference is made in notoo 64 & 65
supra.
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suit remedy but was a companion subsection of the forerunner of
section 610, to be enforced by criminal action. The Landrum-Grif-
fin Bill adopted the Senate version and added a sentence providing
for enforcement by suits filed by the Secretary of Labor." The
final provision for private suits was written into the bill, by amend-
ment from the floor, at the behest of Southern Congressmen. G9
CONCLUSION
In closing, it is interesting to note that during the first year of
Title I, the flood of litigation in the federal courts that some op-
ponents of the Bill of Rights feared has not materialized. Reported
decisions have been rendered in only 20-odd cases, and the over-
whelming majority of those cases were dismissed on the ground
that Title I did not encompass the right alleged by the plaintiff-
member or did not apply retroactively, or that the plaintiff had
not exhausted available internal remedies.
68. See 2 LEG. HIST. 1522 & 1567.
69. Id. at 1662 & 1685.
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APPENDIX A
SECTIONAL INDEX TO THE LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE "BILL OF RIGHTS"
Subject Matter Page*





































*The page references in this index are to the pagination in Legislative
History of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,
cited in note 2 supra. The numbers in parenthesis, which follow most of the




























































"Reasonable rules": (See also
entries on "Reasonable rules
and regulations" under 101
(a)(1).)
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**References to the broad remedies (civil and criminal) which were pro-
vided in the earlier bills as part of omnibus enforcement sections are omit-
ted. References to pertinent debate thereon are included below, however.
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